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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Fluoridation of Public Water Systems:
Valid Exercise of State Police Power
or Constitutional Violation?
DOUGLAS A. BALOG*
I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has never decided
whether a state, in the proper exercise of its police power, can
mandate prophylactic medication for a noncontagious disease
when such disease is treatable by reasonable, less intrusive
means. More specifically, the Supreme Court has never de-
cided whether fluoridation of public water systems is a valid
exercise of state police power or a constitutional violation. It
is the scope of state police power and governmental involve-
ment with the noncontagious disease of dental caries that
will be explored in this Comment.
Police power is the implied constitutional authority al-
lowing states to make laws concerning the health, safety, wel-
fare and morals of its citizens.' States exercise their police
power when they require that students be medicated against
contagious diseases, such as measles, mumps and rubella, by
* This Comment is dedicated to my dad, Ralph F. Balog, who has opposed
fluoridation of public water systems since the early 1960s. The author received
a B.S. from Parks College of St. Louis University in 1985, an M.S. from Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University in 1990, and a J.D. from Pace University School
of Law in 1997. Thanks to Andrea Herbst and her group for their excellent
editing job.
1. The Tenth Amendment, considered to be the source of state police
power, provides that "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. See infra note 22.
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way of inoculations prior to attending public schools. This
immunization requirement is virtually uncontested by the
public because the risk of spreading communicable diseases
to other students is widely recognized. 2
However, states also medicate the public water systems3
with fluoride in an attempt to retard tooth decay - a non-con-
tagious disease,4 also known as dental caries. 5 This state ac-
tion has been vigorously contested by members of the public
because the addition of fluoride to the public water system by
municipal providers6 may have adverse consequences on the
health of the general public which outweigh the benefits al-
legedly provided in reducing tooth decay in children. 7
2. See generally Michael S. Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Govern-
ment in Protecting Citizens from Communicable Diseases, 47 U. CIN. L. REV.
537 (1978).
3. "The term 'public water system' means a system for the provision to the
public of water for human consumption through pipes or other constructed con-
veyances, if such system has at least fifteen service connections or regularly
serves at least twenty-five individuals." Public Health Service (Safe Drinking
Water) Act § 1401(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300f04) (1994), as amended by Act of Aug. 6,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-128, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1613, 1616 (1996)
[hereinafter Safe Drinking Water Act].
4. A disease is a "destructive process in the body, with a specific cause and
characteristic symptoms." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTION-
ARY 523 (2d ed. 1983). Furthermore, tooth decay, technically called dental ca-
ries, is the destruction or necrosis of teeth. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 250 (27th ed. 1988). Therefore, since tooth decay is a de-
structive process in the body, it is a disease. See also infra note 5.
5. Dental caries is "[a] disease of calcified tissues of teeth characterized by
demineralization of the inorganic portion and destruction of the organic ma-
trix." 21 C.F.R. § 355.3(d) (1996).
6. Municipal providers include "a city, town, or other public body created
by or pursuant to State law, or an Indian Tribe." Safe Drinking Water Act
§ 1401(10), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(10) (defining "municipality").
7. Fluoridation is an issue which has caused great controversy since the
1950s. Abundant opposition still exists today, as can be evidenced by surfing
the Internet. See, e.g., Preventative Dental Health Association, The Dangers of
Fluoridation (last modified Dec. 15, 1995)<http://emporium.turnpike.net/P/
PDHA/fluoride/fluor.htm>; Gerard F. Judd, Ph.D & Chemist, Keep Your Teeth,
We Now Know How!! Fluoridation Not the Answer (visited May 10, 1997)
<http://www.all-natural.com/teeth-l.html>; Michael Schachter, M.D., P.A., The
Dangers of Fluoride and Fluoridation (visited May 10, 1997) <http://
www.healthy.net/library/articles/Schacter/fluoride.n.htm>; Health Action Net-
work Society, Is Fluoride Good For You? (visited May 10, 1997)<http://
www.hans.org/fluogood.htm>; Fluoride Issues (visited May 10, 1997)<http://
www.sonic.net/-monty/fluoride.htm>.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/7
1997]FLUORIDATION OF PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 647
Fears concerning the purity of public water sources have
increased dramatically in recent years, due in part to reports
of leaking landfills, corroding pipes and crumbling gasoline
storage tanks tainting water supplies.8 These fears pertain
not only to contaminants such as lead, nitrates, pesticides,
radon and other organic chemicals that inadvertently find
their way into public drinking water, but also to chlorine and
fluorine, which are purposely added to public water systems.9
A public survey conducted in the late 1980s indicated that
"[nlearly 70 percent of Americans are worried about the qual-
ity of their drinking water... [with] their concern center[ing]
on how water looks, tastes or smells."10
In 1992, "Americans spent more than $700 million on in-
home filters" and more than $2 billion on bottled water in ef-
forts to avoid drinking contaminated water. 1 In spite of this,
a common misconception is that fluoridated tap water pro-
vided by a public water system is completely safe to drink.
This assumption is unwarranted because fluoridated tap
water has the potential to cause adverse health conse-
quences, including death.1 2
While the general public supports chlorination'3 to en-
sure that tap water is safer to drink, there is both adamant
8. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION - OFFICE OF CONSUMER/Busi-
NESS EDUCATION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: WATER
TESTING SCAMS. See also Exclusive Interview with Carol Browner, Administra-
tor of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, POPULAR SCIENCE (visited May
10, 1997)<http'//www.popsci.com/context/hiw/water/browner.html>; Mark D.
Uehling, How Safe is Your Water?, POPULAR SCIENCE, Oct. 1996, at 63.
9. See Fit to Drink?, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 1990, at 30 (pertaining to
chlorine, lead, nitrates, pesticides, radon, and other organic chemicals). See
also National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed. Reg.
47,142, 47,146 (1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51) (pertaining to fluoride).
10. Fit to Drink?, CONSUMER REPORTS, Jan. 1990, at 30. See also Is Your
Water Safe?, POPULAR SCIENCE (visited May 10, 1997) <http://www.popsci.com/
context/hiw/water/index.html>.
11. Fran Donegan, Water Treatment Basics, POPULAR MECHANICS, May
1993, at 61.
12. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 921 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1996). In Smith, exces-
sive fluoride in the public water system caused widespread illness in the town
of Hooper Bay, Alaska, and even resulted in the death of one resident. See id.
at 633.
13. Only one case has challenged chlorination of the public water supply.
See Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 52 N.E.2d 566 (Mass. 1943). The town
3
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support and unrelenting opposition to the artificial fluorida-
tion of drinking water. 14 Public debate on the issue of fluori-
dation began in the 1950s and continues to date, resulting in
an abundance of lawsuits opposing fluoridation of public
water systems.
The public support for fluoridation exists mainly because
of the misconception that fluoride in drinking water and
toothpaste benefits the development and overall health of the
teeth of both children and adults. However, even proponents
of fluoridation admit that fluoride does not provide any
health benefits when ingested by an adult, while the poten-
tial exists for causing adverse health problems, such as crip-
pling skeletal fluorosis. 15 Other adverse health problems
linked to fluoride include a 690% increase in bone cancer in
of Hudson, Massachusetts rejected an order by the State Department of Public
Health to chlorinate its water supply because they believed it would adulterate
their otherwise pure water. See id. at 569, 572. The state had ordered chlorina-
tion of the water supply during the war to guard against sabotage by enemy
agents or sympathizers. See id. at 570. The town objected on grounds that its
water supply was naturally pure. See id. at 572. The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts upheld the order to chlorinate as a valid exercise of state po-
lice power to protect against disease-producing organisms. See id. at 571, 572.
14. See, e.g., De Aryan v. Butler, 260 P.2d 98 (Cal. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 1012 (1954) (earliest reported court challenge against fluoridation); Safe
Water Association, Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 516 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994), review dismissed, 520 N.W.2d 91 (Wis. 1994) (most recently reported
court challenge against fluoridation) and other cases cited infra. In addition to
private citizen suits opposing fluoridation, many organizations are also fighting
fluoridation. Some of these include: Global Alliance Against Fluoridation [New
York, NY], The Anti-Fluoridation Association of Victoria [Melbourne, Austra-
lia], Citizens for Safe Drinking Water [San Diego, CA], Safe Water Coalition,
Inc. [Orinda, CA], New York State Coalition Opposed to Fluoridation, Inc. [Old
Bethpage, NY], New Zealand Pure Water Association Inc. [Bay of Plenty, New
Zealand], Support Coalition [Eugene, OR], PA Mandatory Fluoridation Alert
[Oakmont, PA], Safe Water Coalition of Washington State [Spokane, WA], and
the National Pure Water Association [Wakefield, United Kingdom]. See Orga-
nizations Which Oppose Fluoridation (visited May 10, 1997) <http:ll
www.sonic.neth-monty/orgorganiz.htm>. Also, both the Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) have
challenged the maximum fluoride levels in water set by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337
(D.C. Cir. 1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 812 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
15. See generally National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,142 - 47,155 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
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young males, 16 a doubling of hip fractures for both older men
and women, 17 and infertility in women. 18
Some opponents of fluoridation are of the opinion that
there is no correlation between the level of fluoride in water
and dental caries.' 9 As a matter of fact, the federal govern-
ment has conceded that the purported benefit of fluoridation
is limited, as it applies only to developing enamel in the teeth
of children up to the age of nine. 20 The problem with health
laws specifically targeted at children is that children consti-
tute only a minority of the general public because "[tihe most
recent year in which a majority of families included at least
one child among their members was 1982.... [C]hildren are
defined as the householder's own children who are under the
age of 18, have never been married, and are still living at
home."2 ' It logically follows that persons under the age of
eighteen comprise less than 50% of the U.S. population.
16. See Preventative Dental Health Association, Adverse Health Effects
Linked To Fluoride (last modified Jan. 11, 1996) <http://empo-
rium.turnpike.net/P/PDHA/fluoride/adverse.htm> (citing Perry D. Cohn, Ph.D.,
An Epidemiological Report on Drinking Water Fluoridation and Osteosarcoma
in Young Males, New Jersey Department of Health, Environmental Health Ser-
vice (Nov. 8, 1992)).
17. See id. (citing Hip Fracture Rates Related to Fluoridated Water, Journal
of the American Medical Association Vol. 264(4), 500-02 (1990); J.C. Robins &
J.L. Ambrus, Studies on Osteoporosis IX. Effect of Fluoride on Steroid Induced
Osteoporosis, Research Communications in Chemical Pathology and Pharma-
cology, Vol. 37, No. 3, 453-61 (1982)).
18. See id. (citing S.C. Freni, Journal of Toxicology and Environmental
Health, Vol. 42, 109-21 (1994)).
19. See id. (citing M. Diesendorf, Tooth Decay Not Related to Fluoride In-
take From Water, NATURE, Vol. 322, July 10, 1986; J. Colquhoun, Tooth Decay
Related to Economics of Family, AMERICAN LABORATORY, Vol. 17, 1985, at 98-
109; J. Colquhoun, COMMUNrrY DENTISTRY AND ORAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, Vol. 13,
1985 at 37-41; JOHN YL4moUyIANNis, PH.D., FLUORIDE - THE AGING FACTOR (2d
ed. 1986); D. Ziegelbecker, FLUORIDE, Vol. 14, 1981, at 123-28).
20. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,156, 47,171 (Appendix A - proposal for a new warning notice to the
public, which reads: "Fluoride, at the appropriate levels in the drinking water
of children up to the age of nine, reduces cavities."). See also AM. JUR. 3D Proof
of Facts Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 682 (16th ed. 1989), which
states that "fluoride taken after the age of 8 to 10 will have little effect on the
prevention of dental caries."
21. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE - BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSEHOLD
AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MAR. 1994 viii (Sept. 1995).
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Therefore, state laws authorizing municipal fluoridation of
water do not benefit the majority of the public, and thus do
not promote the health, safety, and welfare of Americans, the
majority of whom are adults.
Fluoridation of public water systems has been attacked
in the courts on various constitutional grounds, but has al-
ways been upheld as a valid exercise of state police power.22
This result stems from the application of the "rational basis"
test of judicial review to fluoridation laws by all of the appel-
late courts. The rational basis test is the least demanding
form of judicial review, providing broad deference to the legis-
lature. It merely requires that the goals sought be legiti-
mate, and that the means chosen by the legislature be
rationally related to the achievement of those goals, so as not
to violate the Due Process Clause.23 To pass constitutional
muster under the rational basis test, legislation cannot be ar-
bitrary and must have a reasonable purpose which "bears a
rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective." 24
There is a rebuttable presumption that all legislation is
constitutional, and "those challenging a statute must prove
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt."25 Because of
this presumption of validity, courts will generally apply the
easily-satisfied rational basis test to a challenged law, unless
given a reason to justify a higher standard of review. A con-
stitutional challenge to legislation is one such reason for per-
forming a more demanding judicial review, because the
rational basis test does not apply if the statute "interfere[s]
22. Police power is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution. It is rec-
ognized as a power inherent in state sovereignty to protect the health, safety,
general welfare, and morals of the public, secured by the Tenth Amendment.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). "'Police power' is a general
term containing many ramifications and has never been pin-pointed as to its
exact meaning." City Comm'n of the City of Fort Pierce v. State ex rel. Al-
tenhoff, 143 So. 2d 879, 889 (Fla. 1962).
23. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 769 (1975) (citing Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971)).
24. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (citing Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
25. Safe Water Ass'n Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 516 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994), review dismissed, 520 N.W.2d 91 (Wis. 1994).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/7
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with the free exercise of some fundamental personal right or
liberty."26
The rational basis test is properly applied to legislation
dealing with public health protection, such as the prevention
or spread of contagious or communicable diseases.27 How-
ever, fluoridation of public water systems cannot logically
rise to the level of a public health protection measure, as it is
merely an attempt to prevent the disease of tooth decay,
which is neither contagious nor communicable. Thus, adding
prophylactic medication (fluoride) to drinking water exceeds
the scope of state police power, and courts should apply the
highest standard of judicial review, called "strict scrutiny" to
the legislation authorizing fluoridation.
Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial review
that courts use to determine if a law deprived, infringed, or
interfered with a fundamental constitutional right or lib-
erty.28 To pass this test, the legislation must be narrowly tai-
lored and necessary to achieve a legitimate, compelling state
interest.29 It is first necessary to understand what consti-
tutes a "fundamental constitutional right" in order to know
when a strict scrutiny review is required. The United States
Supreme Court has recently held that "[t]he forcible injection
of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents
a substantial interference with that person's liberty,"30 which
involves a fundamental constitutional right.
This Comment shows why, under strict scrutiny review,
state laws authorizing fluoridation of public water systems
should be struck down as unconstitutional since they impinge
26. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
38 (1973). See also BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 872 (6th ed. 1991) (defining ra-
tional basis test).
27. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(citing Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), which
upheld state imposed vaccinations to prevent epidemics).
28. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
37-38 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that "[ulnless regulatory measures are so confined and are addressed to
the specific areas of compelling legislative concern, the police power would be-
come the great leveler of constitutional rights and liberties").
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
30. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
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a fundamental constitutional right, the means of accomplish-
ing fluoridation is not narrowly tailored, and there is no com-
pelling government interest involved.3 1 To fully understand
the detrimental effects of fluoride on the human body, one
must be familiar with its chemical properties and how it has
become regulated by the federal government. To accomplish
this goal, Part I of this Comment examines the adverse
health effects caused by fluoride ingestion and how fluoride
has come to be labeled as a contaminant, poison, and most
importantly, as a drug for treating a noncontagious disease.
Part II traces the regulatory attempts aimed at ensuring
the provision of safe drinking water by municipalities, and
explains the role of the Environmental Protection Agency in
establishing contaminant levels for fluoride under the Safe
Drinking Water Act. Part III examines the legal challenges
to fluoridation of public water systems, noting that courts
have upheld that it as a valid exercise of state police power.
Part IV addresses the exercise of state police power as a basis
for enacting fluoridation laws.
Further, Part IV analyzes the constitutional protection
afforded to an individual in the context of fluoridation laws.
Finally, Part V concludes that courts have used the wrong
standard in their judicial review of statutes authorizing fluo-
ridation, and that fluoridation laws will not pass constitu-
tional muster under a strict scrutiny standard of review.
This is because fluoridation statutes violate the constitution-
ally protected liberty interest to be free from unwanted medi-
cal treatment recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
31. There is no compelling state interest to impose regulations for noncon-
tagious or nonhazardous health concerns. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv-
ices International, 431 U.S. 678, 690 (1977) (holding that a statute controlling
the distribution of nonhazardous contraceptives "bears no relation to the State's
interest in protecting [public] health"). See also Michael S. Morgenstern, The
Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Citizens from Communicable Dis-
eases, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 537, 538 n.2 (1978), which recognizes the governmen-
tal interest only in communicable diseases, which are "disease[s] the causative
agent of which may pass or be carried from one person to another directly or
indirectly." (citing DOmRLND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 455 (25th ed.
1974)).
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1990 cases, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health32 and
Washington v. Harper.3 3 These two decisions have not yet
been relied upon by a lower court in the constitutional analy-
sis of fluoridation laws.
Fluoridating public water in an attempt to target chil-
dren whose permanent teeth are still developing is like using
a shotgun to shoot an apple off someone's head; sure, you hit
the apple, but the side effects are undesirable.
I. Health Effects on the Human Body From Fluoride
Ingestion
To understand why most, if not all, states have laws pro-
viding for the addition of fluoride to the public water systems
and why the public opinion is split as to the benefits and
harms of fluoridation, some background information on fluo-
ride is useful. Fluoride is a binary compound, 34 consisting of
the element fluorine3 5 combined with another element, such
as copper, magnesium, iron, sodium, or zinc. 36 Fluorine has
been estimated to be the thirteenth most abundant element
in the earth's crust and is usually found only in combination
with other elements, producing compounds called fluorides. 37
It is crucial to note that fluorine is not an essential nutri-
ent needed by the human body.38 Virtually all foods contain
trace amounts of fluoride, but the quantity is negligible and
not considered for purposes of regulating maximum fluoride
levels in drinking water.39 The use of fluoride for medicinal
32. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
33. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
34. A binary compound is composed of two elements. See WEBSTER'S NEW
UNWERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 183 (2d ed. 1983).
35. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 643 (27th ed. 1988).
36. See John J. Miller, Ph.D., The Fluoride Ion, PREVENTION, July 1964, at
56.
37. See GEORGE L. WALDBOTT, M.D., FLUORIDATION: THE GREAT DILEMMA
20 (1978).
38. See Jonathan Forman, M.D., What Looks Like a Neurosis May Be a Flu-
orosis, PREVENTION, June 1964, at 92. See also John J. Miller, Ph.D., The Fluo-
ride Ion, PREVENTION, July 1964, at 57-58.
39. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,145 (Table 1) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51). See also Kraus v.
City of Cleveland, 116 N.E.2d 779, 792 (Ohio 1953).
9
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purposes originated because it was discovered in communi-
ties where the water supply naturally contained a small per-
centage of dissolved fluorides that the tendency toward tooth
decay in children was notably reduced. 40 Accordingly, the
United States Public Health Service endorsed the artificial
fluoridation of public drinking water in 1950.41 Because the
government is now actively involved in preventing tooth de-
cay (a periodontal disease), it is actually practicing medicine,
which is defined as "the science and art of... preventing dis-
ease," and fluoride may be considered a 'medicine' which is
defined as "any drug or other substance used in treating dis-
ease ... ."42
The decision to add fluoride to public water systems
sparked controversy because "the fluoride encountered in
'natural' drinking water is calcium fluoride,"43 but artificial
fluoridation is accomplished by using either sodium fluo-
ride,44 sodium fluorosilicate, 45 or hydrofluorosilicic acid.46
Sodium fluoride was the first compound used in public water
systems to artificially fluoridate public water, which caused
an uproar because sodium fluoride is a known poison used
commercially as an insecticide, rodenticide, wood preserva-
tive and fungicide, in ceramics production, and in light metal
40. See 10 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 109 (1992). This observation was lim-
ited to only those children whose teeth were still developing when they drank
the fluoridated water. See id.
41. See Michael Wollan, Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government-
Sponsored Technology, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1128 (1968).
42. WEBSTER'S NEw UNvaERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1118 (2d ed. 1983)
(defining "medicine").
43. ANNE-LISE GoTzSCHE, THE FLUORIDE QUESTION 68 (1975).
44. For the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) detailing the characteris-
tics and health hazards of sodium fluoride, see <gopher'//gopher.chem.utah.edu/
00/MSDS/S/SODIUJM%20FLUORIDE> (visited May 10, 1997).
45. The chemical symbol of sodium fluorosilicate, a salt of hydrofluorosilicic
acid, is Na 2SiF 6. See GEORGE L. WALDBOTr, M.D., FLUORIDATION: THE GREAT
DILEMMA 24 (1978).
46. Also called hydrofluosilicic acid, its chemical symbol is H2SiF6. See id.
Hydrofluorosilicic acid and sodium fluorosilicate are used commercially for elec-
troplating, water fluoridation, wood preservation, concrete hardening, a flux for
metal casting, production of synthetic mica, extraction of zirconium, and for
making acid resistant cements. See id. at 24, 25.
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production. 47 The federal government recognizes the toxicity
of sodium fluoride because it is regulated as an active ingredi-
ent in pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).48 Pesticides with highly toxic
quantities of sodium fluoride in them must have the skull and
crossbones symbol as well as the word poison prominently
displayed on the container. 49
The government promoters seeking to add fluoride to the
public water systems back in the 1950s held a conference and
tried to diffuse this issue by instructing those in attendance
not to use the word "artificial" in conjunction with fluorida-
tion and not to tell the public that sodium fluoride is being
used because "that is rat poison."50 Instead, the public
should only be told that "fluorides" are added to the water.5 1
This is hardly comforting because in a table of water-borne
contaminants, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
lists fluoride between cyanide and mercury, two toxic sub-
47. See id. at 25.
48. FIFRA requires all new pesticides to be registered, as well as the re-
registration of pesticides first registered before November 1, 1984. See Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a, 136a-1 (excep-
tions omitted). The Special Review and Reregistration Division in EPA's Office
of Pesticide Programs publishes a document called the "Rainbow Report" (Sta-
tus of Pesticides in Reregistration and Special Review) which lists sodium fluo-
ride as an active ingredient in pesticides. See Environmental Protection
Agency, Pesticide Active Ingredients Index, (visited May 10, 1997)<http'/
www.epa.gov/Rainbow>. Sodium Fluoride was originally labeled as an "eco-
nomic poison" under FIFRA. See 7 U.S.C. § 135a(a)(4) (1981) (omitted). "The
term 'economic poison' means (1) any substance or mixture of substances in-
tended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any insects, rodents,
nematodes, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant or animal life or viruses,
except viruses on or in living man or other animals, which the Administrator
shall declare to be a pest.... ." 7 U.S.C. § 135(a) (omitted).
49. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(2)(D) (1991) (emphasis added).
50. Promotion and Application of Water Fluoridation: Hearings Before the
Dept. of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations, 89th Cong.,
Vol. 5, (1967) (statement of Dr. John W. Knutson, Chief, Division of Dental Pub-
lic Health, Public Health Service, at the proceedings of the Fourth Annual Con-
ference of State Dental Directors with the Public Health Service and the
Children's Bureau, held at the Federal Security Building in Washington, D.C.,
on June 6-8, 1951).
51. See id.
11
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stances that the public would certainly never tolerate to be
purposely added to their water supply.52
The scientific community is sharply divided as to the det-
rimental effects of fluoride on the human body.53 The EPA
solicited and received over 400 written public comments and
held two full days of public hearings in Washington, D.C. per-
taining to the issue of whether fluoride in public drinking
water posed adverse health effects. 54 Many professional
health organizations and state officials believed that fluoride
in drinking water causes no adverse health effects, but other
commentators believed that it can cause serious adverse
health effects, such as crippling skeletal fluorosis, 55
mutagenicity, 56 and oncogenicity. 57 Dr. John Yiamouyiannis,
an expert biochemist witness who has testified in several law-
suits challenging fluoridation statutes, authored a book enti-
tled Fluoride - The Aging Factor.58
In this book, Dr. Yiamouyiannis describes, among other
adverse health effects, how fluoride damages enzymes and in-
terferes with collagen formation in the human body, resulting
52. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.23(k)(3)(ii) (1994). See also 40 C.F.R. § 141.51
(1996) (contaminant table listing fluoride between cyanide and lead). Addition-
ally, "[firom today's perspective, health professionals were reckless to promote
mass fluoridation as early as 1951" because fluoride is an acute poison and only
crude risk data was available then. Allan Mazur, Why Do We Worry About
Trace Poisons?, RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT 35, 41 (Winter 1996).
Mr. Mazur believes that in 1951 health professionals were not as concerned
about chronic exposure to trace poisons as we are today, and that if fluoridation
of public water systems were proposed today, supported only by the risk data
available in 1951, it would not be approved. See id. at 41-42.
53. See generally National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,142 - 47,155 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
54. See id. at 47,145.
55. Fluorosis is "a condition due to exposure to excessive amounts of fluo-
rine or its compounds," resulting in combined osteosclerosis and osteomalacia
(alternating brittle and soft areas of bone). DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 643 (27th ed. 1988).
56. A mutation is "a sudden variation in some inheritable characteristic...,
as distinguished from a variation resulting from generations of gradual
change." WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1186 (2d ed.
1983).
57. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,145 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
58. See JOHN YLAMO YLANNIS, PH.D., FLUORIDE - THE AGING FACTOR (1983).
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in premature aging.59 This book, along with eighty-eight
other technical reports and studies, were considered by the
EPA in its determination of the Recommended Maximum
Contaminant Level (RMCL) for fluoride to be published in the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).60 The EPA concluded
that there was an inadequate basis to say that fluoride is
oncogenic, mutagenic, or results in allergic or idiosyncratic
sensitivity.61 However, the EPA acknowledged that the con-
clusions of the studies conflicted and that there are ongoing
chronic rat and mouse bioassays designed to measure the
oncogenic62 potential of fluoride, which they will reconsider
when the results become available. 63
The EPA did acknowledge that dental fluorosis, a condi-
tion manifested by staining and/or pitting of the teeth, can
result from ingesting fluoride, but labeled it as a cosmetic ef-
fect rather than an adverse health effect within the meaning
of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 64 The EPA also concluded
that crippling skeletal fluorosis has been thoroughly docu-
mented to be associated with the consumption of fluoridated
drinking water in the U.S., and accordingly set the RMCL to
protect against this adverse health effect. 65 In response to
59. See id. passim.
60. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,153 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
61. See id. at 47,151.
62. Oncogenicity is a factor that causes the development of cancer. See
CONCISE SCIENCE DICTIONARY 484 (2d ed. 1991).
63. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,147 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51). In 1993, the EPA an-
nounced that it would not revise the maximum contaminant level goal (MCLG)
for fluoride after it had considered recent reports concerning the health effects
from ingesting fluoride. See Drinking Water Maximum Contaminant Level
Goal; Fluoride, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,826 (1993). The decision was based on the re-
sults of a study performed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), which
saw no immediate need to change the MCLG, but felt that further research was
needed in the areas of dental fluorosis, bone strength and fractures, and carci-
nogenicity. See id. at 68,827. Accordingly, the EPA announced that it will con-
tinue to solicit public comments on this issue, and hopes to issue a final decision
after the NAS research is concluded, which it anticipates will be around the
year 2001. See id.
64. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142 (summary) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
65. See id.
13
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public comments opposing fluoridation, the EPA emphasized
that the Safe Drinking Water Act "prohibits [the] EPA from
requiring the addition of any substance for preventative
health care purposes unrelated to [the] contamination of
drinking water," and that just because it issued final regula-
tions does not mean that it endorses the fluoridation of public
water systems.66
The federal government also regulates the ingestion of
fluoride by humans in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
chapter 1, subchapter D, part 355 - Anticaries Drug Products
for Over-the-Counter Human Use, 67 and also in chapter 1,
subchapter B, part 165 - Beverages. 68 Fluoride used in a
toothpaste, dentifrice, mouthwash, gel, or rinse is considered
to be an anticaries drug, which is "[a] drug that aids in the
prevention and prophylactic treatment of dental cavities (de-
cay, caries)."69 Three sources of fluoride are used for topical
application in the mouth: sodium fluoride, 70  sodium
monofluorophosphate, 71 and stannous fluoride.72 While the
maximum permissible fluoride concentration in water is 4mg/
L, it is much higher in topical applications, depending on its
form. For example, dentifrices7 3 contain a theoretical total
fluorine concentration of 850 to 1150 parts per million
(ppm) 74 in a paste dosage form.75 This concentration is aimed
at obtaining at least 650 ppm76 of fluoride ions, 77 whereas
66. Id. at 47,153.
67. Codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 355 (1996).
68. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is now allowing bottled water
to have fluoride added, but requires that it have a label listing fluoride as an
ingredient. See 60 Fed. Reg. 57,076, 57,079 (1995) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 165.110o(b)(4)(ii) (1997)).
69. 21 C.F.R. § 355.3(c) (1996).
70. See 21 C.F.R. § 355.10(a) (1996).
71. See id. § 355.10(b) (1996).
72. See id. § 355. 10(c) (1996).
73. A dentifrice is [ain abrasive-containing dosage form for delivering an
anticaries drug to the teeth." 21 C.F.R. § 355.3(e) (1996).
74. One part per million is the same concentration as one milligram per
liter (mg/L). See I. TAXEL, CONVERSION FACTORS (1964).
75. See 21 C.F.R. § 355.10(a)(1) (1996).
76. See id. But see § 355.10(c)(i) (1996) (requiring stannous fluoride denti-
frices to have a fluoride ion concentration of at least 700 ppm). Stannous fluo-
ride is a compound of fluorine and tin. See WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL
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treatment rinses78 target a fluoride ion concentration of 0.01 -
0.05 percent in an aqueous solution. 79
The government has recognized the adverse health ef-
fects that may result from swallowing either fluoridated
toothpaste or mouth rinse, and requires that warning labels
be affixed to the anticaries drug products.80 All fluoride den-
tifrices (tooth pastes and tooth powders) must be labeled
"Warning: Keep out of the reach of children under 6 years of
age.""' The labels for rinse and gel products emphasize the
importance of spitting out the solution and not swallowing
it.82 This is because fluoride is very toxic, and at least one
child has been killed from swallowing a fluoride jell applied
by a dental hygienist.8 3 In summary, fluoride is neither a vi-
tamin nor a mineral necessary for human health.8 4 Rather,
fluorine is a highly reactive element8 5 used as a prophylactic
drug to help prevent tooth decay in developing permanent
teeth.86 Fluoride provides no benefits to adults, and ingestion
of it will only result in the health problems previously
mentioned.8 7
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1773 (2d ed. 1983). Stannous fluoride has a chemical
symbol of SnF2. See GEORGE L. WALDBOTT, M.D., FLUORIDATION: THE GREAT
DILEMMA 25 (1978).
77. A fluoride ion is "[tihe negatively charged atom of the chemical element
fluorine." 21 C.F.R. § 355.3(g) (1996).
78. A treatment rinse is "[a] liquid dosage form for delivering an anticaries
drug to the teeth." Id. § 355.3(j).
79. See id. § 355.10(a)(3).
80. See generally id. § 355.50 (1996) (Labeling of anticaries drug products).
81. Id. § 355.50(c)(1).
82. See id. § 355.50(d)(2), (d)(4). In fact, many toothpastes contain a warn-
ing stating that children under 6 years old should use only a pea-sized amount
and should be supervised to prevent swallowing. Such a warning is needed be-
cause swallowing too much fluoride can be fatal. See infra note 83.
83. See Robert D. McFadden, $750,000 Given in Child's Death in Fluoride
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1979, at 23 (a 3 year old boy died after receiving an
overdose of fluoride at a New York City Dental Clinic).
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85. See GEORGE L. WALDBOTT, M.D., FLUORIDATION: THE GREAT DILEMMA
20 (1978).
86. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
87. See generally National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,142 - 47,155 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
15
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II. Legislative History of Safe Drinking Water
One of the first published cases attempting to ensure the
safety of drinking water was Commonwealth v. Towanda
Water-Works.88 In Towanda, the Pennsylvania Attorney
General alleged that the public water in the borough of
Towanda was impure, unwholesome, polluted, unfit for use
by the public, and dangerous to their lives and health.8 9 The
evidence as to the purity of the water was conflicting, but the
jury found that the water was wholesome, 90 even though it
was not pure.91 The court took judicial notice that the only
possible way to obtain pure water was by distillation.92 Thus,
the court held that the statute requiring "pure" water to be
furnished for public consumption was to be construed to
mean wholesome water, not pure in the abstract or chemical
sense.93 This case laid the foundation for the first drinking
water standard set by the U.S. Public Health Service.
Promulgated in 1914, this standard was designed to pro-
tect the public from acute bacterial diseases, 94 and eventually
led to the enactment of federal legislation in 1974 known as
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). 95 The Safe Drinking
Water Act requires the EPA Administrator to identify water-
borne contaminants and publish maximum contaminant
levels (enforceable standards) and recommended maximum
contaminant levels (nonenforceable health goals) for munici-
pal providers. 96 The SDWA was amended in 1986, changing
the Recommended Maximum Contaminant Level (RMCL)
88. 15 A. 440 (Pa. 1888).
89. See id. at 441.
90. Wholesome water must "not be injurious to the health of those using it."
Id. at 442.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 443.
93. See 15 A. at 443.
94. See EDWARD J. CALABRESE ET AL., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 1 (1989).
95. Originally promulgated as the Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, title
XIV (1944). The Safe Drinking Water Act is now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to
300j-26, as amended by Act of Aug. 6, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-128, 1996
U.S.C.CA.N. (110 Stat.) 1613-93 (1996).
96. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142 (summary) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51). See also EDWARD J.
CALABRESE ET AL., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 17-18.
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terminology to Maximum Contaminant Level Goals
(MCLG).97 The EPA Administrator must promulgate na-
tional primary drinking water regulations for contaminants
which may have an adverse effect on the health of persons
and which are "known or anticipated to occur in public water
systems."98 The EPA issued national primary drinking water
regulations for fluoride because it concluded that crippling
skeletal fluorosis99 is an adverse health effect, and has been
thoroughly documented to be associated with consumption of
fluoridated drinking water.'0 0
The EPA promulgated a Maximum Contaminant
Level 10' (MCL) for fluoride in the 1985 National Interim Pri-
mary Drinking Water Regulations, pursuant to section 1412
of the Safe Drinking Water Act.'0 2 This interim MCL varied
from 1.4 milligrams per liter (mg/L) to 2.4 mg/L, depending
upon the annual average ambient air temperatures. 0 3 This
interim amount was twice the optimum fluoride concentra-
tion, and was determined to strike an appropriate balance be-
tween the occurrence of dental fluorosis10 and the prevention
of dental caries. 10 5
In response to this proposed MCL, the EPA received over
400 written public comments and held two full days of public
97. See Safe Drinking Water Act § 1412(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(a)(2). See
also EDWARD J. CALABRESE ET AL., SAFE DRINIUNG WATER ACT 19.
98. Safe Drinking Water Act § 1412(b)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A).
99. "The most clearly established fluoride-induced bone complaint is crip-
pling skeletal fluorosis, also called chronic fluoride toxicity . " ANNE-USE
GOTZSCHE, THE FLUORIDE QUESTION 86 (1975).
100. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142 (summary) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
101. The maximum contaminant level is the maximum permissible level of a
contaminant in the public water system which may adversely affect the public
welfare. See Safe Drinking Water Act § 1401(2), (3), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(2), (3).
102. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,143 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
103. See id.
104. Fluorosis is "[a] condition caused by an excessive intake of fluorides (2
or more p.p.m. in drinking water), characterized mainly by mottling, staining,
or hypoplasia of the enamel of the teeth, although skeletal bones are also af-
fected." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 599 (25th ed. 1990).
105. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,143 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
17
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hearings as to whether fluoride in drinking water posed ad-
verse health consequences. 10 6 Based upon all the informa-
tion it received, the EPA set the Recommended Maximum
Contaminant Level (RMCL) of fluoride at 4 mg/L, 10 7 and sub-
sequently set the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) at 4
mg/L also.' 0 8 The EPA promulgated an RMCL for fluoride
because it agreed with Surgeon Generals Shapiro and Koop
that adverse health effects stemming from the ingestion of
fluoride include "death, gastrointestinal hemorrhage or irri-
tation, arthralgias, and crippling fluorosis."10 9 RMCLs are
non-enforceable health goals which are set at levels for which
there are "no known or anticipated adverse health effects"
and which leave a margin of safety to protect against crip-
pling skeletal fluorosis. 110 The difference between an MCL
and an RMCL is that the RMCL is supposed "to be based only
on health and safety considerations while an MCL takes fea-
sibility and cost into consideration.""'
The Administrator must also promulgate the national
secondary drinking water regulations, which are designed to
protect the public health by controlling contaminants that
"may adversely affect the odor or appearance of [drinking]
water."" 2 These secondary regulations specify the Secon-
dary Maximum Contaminant Levels (SMCLs) which limit
those contaminants that "may adversely affect the aesthetic
quality of drinking water such as taste, odor, color and ap-
pearance . . . ."113 Fluoride was not included in the original
list of contaminants, but in 1985 the EPA Administrator pro-
posed a SMCL of 2.0 mg/L for fluoride. 1 4 This limit was
106. See id. at 47,145.
107. See id. at 47,143.
108. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.62 (1996).
109. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed. Reg.
47,142, 47,143 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51) (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 47,142.
111. Id. at 47,155.
112. See Safe Drinking Water Act §§ 1401(2), 1412(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(2),
300g-l(c).
113. National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,195
(1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 143.3).
114. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,156 (1985).
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eventually approved and incorporated into the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations (CFR).11
If the EPA's SMCL for fluoride is exceeded, but the MCL
is not, the CFRs require that the municipal water provider
send the following notice to all paying users, as well as to the
state public health officer:
Public Notice
Dear User:
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency requires
that we send you this notice on the level of fluoride in your
drinking water. The drinking water in your community
has a fluoride concentration of [fill in amount] milligrams
per liter (mg/l).
Federal regulations require that fluoride, which occurs
naturally in your water supply, not exceed a concentration
of 4.0 mg/l in drinking water. This is an enforceable stan-
dard called a Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL), and it
has been established to protect the public health. Expo-
sure to drinking water levels above 4.0 mg/l for many years
may result in some cases of crippling skeletal fluorosis,
which is a serious bone disorder.
Federal law also requires that we notify you when
monitoring indicates that the fluoride in your drinking
water exceeds 2.0 mg/l. This is intended to alert families
about dental problems that might affect children under
nine years of age. The fluoride concentration of your water
exceeds this federal guideline.
Fluoride in children's drinking water at levels of ap-
proximately 1 mg/1 reduces the number of dental cavities.
However, some children exposed to levels of fluoride
greater than about 2.0 mg/I may develop dental fluorosis.
Dental fluorosis, in its moderate and severe forms, is a
brown staining and/or pitting of the permanent teeth.
Because dental fluorosis occurs only when developing
teeth (before they erupt from the gums) are exposed to ele-
vated fluoride levels, households without children are not
expected to be affected by this level of fluoride. Families
with children under the age of nine are encouraged to seek
115. See 40 C.F.R. § 143.3 (1996).
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other sources of drinking water for their children to avoid
the possibility of staining and pitting.
Your water supplier can lower the concentration of flu-
oride in your water so that you will still receive the bene-
fits of cavity prevention while the possibility of stained and
pitted teeth is minimized. Removal of fluoride may in-
crease your water costs. Treatment systems are also com-
mercially available for home use. Information on such
systems is available at the address given below. Low fluo-
ride bottled drinking water that would meet all standards
is also commercially available.
For further information, contact [Public Water System
employee's name, address, and phone number] at your
water system. 116
The EPA has published a disclaimer in the national pri-
mary drinking water regulation for fluoride stating that: (1)
they do not endorse fluoridation, even though they estab-
lished an RMCL, (2) public water systems are not required to
meet the RMCL, (3) states are not required to adopt the
RMCL, and (4) fluoridation is a matter for state and local
authorities."17
The RMCL for fluoride promulgated by the EPA is based
upon the presumption that a child will drink 1.4 liters of tap
water a day and that an adult will drink 2.0 liters a day. 18
However, the EPA does not admit that suppliers of water" 9
frequently violate the RMCL as well as the MCL for fluoride.
In fiscal year 1986, 740 Public Water Systems (PWS) were in
violation of fluoride levels.120 Moreover, fluoride was the sec-
116. Id. § 143.5. Despite the requirement for this notice, the EPA "has been
criticized for failure to enforce required water quality standards and for not
reporting to the public the failure of municipal water companies to meet stan-
dards." A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 16 (4th ed.
1993).
117. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,142, 47,153 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
118. See id. at 47,145. If an adult drinks more than two liters of water per
day, it logically follows that they are ingesting more fluoride than is calculated
to be safe by the EPA.
119. "The term 'supplier of water' means any person who owns or operates a
public water system." Safe Drinking Water Act § 1401(5), 42 U.S.C. § 300f(5).
120. See EDWARD J. CALABRESE ET AL., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 112 tbl. 5.
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ond most frequently violated contaminant by Significant
Non-Compliers (SNCs). 121
III. Legal Challenges Against Public Water System
Fluoridation
The United States Supreme Court has never decided
whether a state can compel individuals to ingest fluoride
through public drinking water, when fluoride can be adminis-
tered by other reasonable, less intrusive means. Accordingly,
some state courts have limited their constitutional analysis of
fluoridation statutes, based on reasoning that since the
United States Supreme Court has declined to hear any fluori-
dation cases, there must not be any substantial constitutional
issues.122 The trial court in Paduano v. City of New York 123
held that "lwihile denials of certiorari do not constitute deci-
sions on the merits, it is clear that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that no substantial Federal questions are
presented by objections to fluoridation."124 The court as-
121. See id. at 108. SNCs "are those systems which have the most serious
and more frequent violations." Id. at 106.
122. Cases that the Supreme Court has declined to hear include: Birnel v.
Town of Fircrest, 335 P.2d 819 (Wash. 1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 10
(1959), reh'g. denied, 361 U.S. 904 (1959); Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 74
So. 2d 142 (La. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892 (1954); City of Canton v.
Whitman, 337 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio 1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 956 (1976);
De Aryan v. Butler, 260 P.2d 98 (D. Cal. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1012
(1954); Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
912 (1955); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Com. P1. 1953),
aftd, 127 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956); Min-
nesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976),
appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976); Paduano v. City of New York, 257
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d 437 (N.Y.A.D. 1965), aftd, 218
N.E.2d 339 (N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Readey v. St. Louis
County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622 (Mo. 1961), appeal dismissed and cert. de-
nied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 906 (1962); Safe Water Founda-
tion of Texas v. City of Houston, 661 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), appeal
dismissed, 469 U.S. 801 (1984); Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 198 N.E.2d 326
(Ill. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
123. 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
124. Id. at 542. The Paduano court recognized that the judiciary did not
have power to impose fluoridation on anyone, but if some proof was proffered
that fluoridation has harmful side effects and is not in the interests of the com-
munity, they might be able to overrule the legislation authorizing it. See id.
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sumed, however, that the United States Supreme Court is, in
effect, affirming the lower court when it dismisses the ap-
peal.125 However, this is not true, and courts should be com-
pelled to analyze all constitutional issues in light of the most
recent Supreme Court decisions. 126
A. Challenges Based on States' Lack of Authority to
Fluoridate Public Water Systems
The first reported challenge to the addition of fluoride to
a public water supply by a state was in De Aryan v. Butler.1 27
In De Aryan, a taxpayer brought suit seeking to enjoin the
addition of fluoride to water furnished to San Diego. 128 The
basis for the challenge was that the city council exceeded its
authority in enacting the fluoridation resolution. 29 The De
Aryan court found that the State Board of Public Health was
part of the Department of Public Health and thus had the
"power to formulate policies affecting public health, and to
adopt, promulgate, repeal, and amend rules and regulations
consistent with law for the protection of the public health." 30
The State Legislature had "delegated to the State Board of
Public Health the duty and powers necessary to control and
125. See id. at 538 n.*.
126. The Supreme Court has noted "that all a denial of a petition for a writ of
certiorari means is that fewer than four members of the Court thought it should
be granted." Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950). The
Court also stated that they have "rigorously insisted that such a denial carries
with it no implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a
case which it has declined to review." Id. This has been said again and again,
and the Court repeatedly has to reiterate this admonition. See id. Therefore,
all courts that declined to rule on the constitutional challenges to fluoridation
because they interpreted a denial of certiorari as the equivalent to an affirma-
tion of the lower court's decision were wrong! For a detailed analysis of what
certiorari denial constitutes, see Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Deni-
als, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1979).
127. 260 P.2d 98 (D. Cal. 1953).
128. See id. at 99.
129. See id. at 101. See also Young v. Board of Health of Borough of Somer-
ville, 293 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1972); Rogowski v. City of Detroit, 132 N.W.2d 16
(Mich. 1965). An act performed without any authority to do so is known as
"ultra vires." An [u]ltra vires act of [a] municipality is one which is beyond
powers conferred upon it by law." BLAci's LAW DICTION AY 1057 (6th ed. 1991).
130. 260 P.2d at 101.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/7
1997]FLUORIDATION OF PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 667
regulate the purity, potability, and wholesomeness of public
waters in this state."13 1
The De Aryan court further found that the entire police
power of the state is vested in the legislature, and is only lim-
ited by the State Constitution and other applicable stat-
utes. 132 Furthermore, even though the enforcement of police
power may seem harsh at times, it is an indispensable part of
state sovereignty and may not be legally limited unless its
use is unreasonable and arbitrarily invoked.133 Accordingly,
applying the rational basis test, the De Aryan court concluded
that the addition of fluoride to the public water system was a
valid exercise of police power as long as it was not unreasona-
ble or an abuse of discretion.134 Although the petitioner tax-
payer proffered exhibits, reports, and expert witnesses at the
trial, there was no allegation in the petition that the City
Council abused its discretion or made an unreasonable deci-
sion to endorse fluoridation. 135 Therefore, the District Court
of Appeal could not consider the evidence. 136
A somewhat different challenge against the authority of
a city to fluoridate the public water system was made in Wil-
son v. City of Mountlake Terrace.137 In Wilson, the appel-
lants, representing a class of 300 persons in an
unincorporated area adjacent to Mountlake Terrace, objected
to the introduction of fluoride into their water by the Alder-
wood Water District.138 Alderwood was under contract to
provide fluoridated water to Mountlake Terrace, and also pro-
vided water to the appellants through a common distribution
line.139 The appellants argued that a city cannot exercise its
police power outside its boundaries, and, therefore, Moun-
tlake Terrace was without authority to impose fluoridation on
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 101, 102.
134. See id. at 102.
135. See De Aryan v. Butler, 260 P.2d at 99, 103.
136. See id. at 102.
137. 417 P.2d 632 (1966).
138. See id. at 632, 633.
139. See id.
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persons living outside the city.140 The appellants, however,
did not claim to be harmed by the fluoridation, and stipulated
that fluoridation did not render the water unfit for human
consumption according to health department standards. 141
The Supreme Court of Washington agreed with the trial
court's finding that "the fluoridation of appellant's water is
the incidental, although inevitable, result of the city's exer-
cise of its police power .... -142 Applying the rational basis
test, the court affirmed the judgment for Mountlake Terrace
allowing continued fluoridation because of the finding that
appellants were not harmed. 143
B. Scope of Police Power Exceeded by the States
In 1954, one year after the De Aryan challenge, residents
of Tulsa sought to enjoin enforcement of an ordinance author-
izing fluoridation of the city water supply, alleging that it
constituted an unwarranted exercise of state police power.144
These plaintiffs, in Dowell v. City of Tulsa, argued that
Oklahoma had "never ... attempt[ed] to regulate or control
any disease except those that are 'contagious, infectious, or
dangerous'."145 The Dowell court, however, did not believe
that the Oklahoma Legislature "intended to restrict its enact-
ment of measures designed to promote the public health and
welfare to those designed to prevent the spread of [such] dis-
eases."146 The court found support for its position by noting
the many statutes regulating food, lodging, and other sub-
jects "that have no direct connection with or relation to [such]
diseases." 147 Thus, using the rational basis test, the court up-
held the fluoridation statute as a valid exercise of state police
power "relating to eugenics and the maintenance of a
healthy, normal, and socially sound populace." 148
140. See id. at 634.
141. See id. at 635.
142. 417 P.2d at 635.
143. Wilson v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 417 P.2d 632, 635 (Wash. 1966).
144. See Dowell v. City of Tulsa, 273 P.2d 859, 860 (Okla. 1954).
145. Id. at 861.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 862 (quoting 11 Am. JuR. Constitutional Law § 271, 1023).
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That same year, the appellant in McGurren v. City of
Fargo49 challenged the police power of the state, alleging
that an implied contract exists between the public water sys-
tem supplier and the consumer.150 The rationale was that
the city furnished and sold water in a proprietary capacity,
and since the appellant had performed his contractual re-
quirements by making the necessary service arrangements
and paying the city for the water, then the city was mutually
obliged to furnish water that was as reasonably pure and
wholesome as possible.' 51 The appellant further argued that
the city breached the implied contract by adding fluoride to
the water because the water was no longer free from any con-
tamination, rendering the water "unfit for domestic use and
unsafe and dangerous to individuals." 52 The appellant then
argued that this breach endangered the health of the commu-
nity, thereby exceeding the police power, which is intended to
protect the public's health.153 Accordingly, the McGurren
court felt that an injunction preventing the addition of fluo-
ride to the public water supply was proper and overruled the
appellee's demurrer,154 remanding the case to the district
court to allow the City of Fargo answer the complaint. 55
C. Constitutional Challenges
The constitutional challenges brought against the fluori-
dation of public water systems have covered the entire spec-
trum of colorable arguments. These arguments include First
Amendment freedom of religion, Fourteenth Amendment de-
nial of liberty, abridgement of privileges and immunities, and
denial of equal protection, and finally, Ninth Amendment in-
vasion of personal privacy.
149. 66 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1954).
150. See id. at 209.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 211 (citing 56 AM. JuR. Waterworks § 75 at 76, § 79 at 983).
153. See id. at 209, 212.
154. A "demurrer" is "[a]n assertion that the complaint does not set forth a
cause of action upon which relief can be granted." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 298
(6th ed. 1991).
155. See 66 N.W.2d at 212. The decision of the district court on remand is
unreported.
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1. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution provides, in pertinent part, that
no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws. 156
Challenges to public water system fluoridation statutes typi-
cally include allegations of: (1) deprivation of personal lib-
erty; (2) abridgement of one's privileges and immunities; or
(3) denial of equal protection of the law.
(a) Deprivation of Personal Liberty
Two years after a federal court in California rendered the
decision in De Aryan,'157 the seminal case of Kraus v. City of
Cleveland'58 was decided in Ohio Supreme Court. The plain-
tiff in Kraus attacked legislation authorizing fluoridation of
the public water supply as an infringement of fundamental
liberties. 59 Urging that every individual has a personal lib-
erty right "to protect his health as he deems best to insure a
long and happy life," the plaintiff argued that fluoridation of
the city water supply deprives him of this right in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 60 The Kraus court recognized
this personal liberty right, but noted that it is not absolute
because it is subject to limits stemming from the police pow-
ers of the state. 16 ' The plaintiff argued, however, that indi-
vidual rights are subordinate to state police powers only
when there is an overriding public purpose, such as a present
danger, necessity, or emergency, and suggested that no such
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
157. 260 P.2d 98 (D. Cal. 1953).
158. 127 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956).
159. See id. at 610.
160. Id. See also Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622,
628-32 (Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 8 (1962).
161. See 116 N.E.2d at 794.
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purpose existed to justify fluoridation of the water supply. 162
The Kraus court then examined the scope of the police power
under Ohio law and found that if it satisfied the following
four prongs, it was a valid exercise of police power: (1) it
must be reasonable and necessary to achieve the legislature's
objectives; (2) it must not violate the U.S. Constitution; (3) it
must not be in direct conflict with any provision of the State
Constitution; and (4) it must not be used in an arbitrary and
oppressive manner. 163
The public health measure at issue in Kraus pertained to
the prevention of dental caries by increasing resistance in
children to tooth decay, which the court felt was a "serious
and widespread disease."16 4 Accordingly, the Kraus court
found that "any reasonable measure designed to decrease or
retard the incidence of dental caries is in the interest and
welfare of the public," and that this exercise of police power
was not arbitrary or oppressive. 16 5 Thus, although the Kraus
court did not disagree that fluoridation is an invasion of a
person's constitutional right to protect his health as he deems
best, it applied the rational basis test and held that this right
must yield to police power exercised to prevent caries in
children.166
(b) Abridgment of Privileges and Immunities
In Teeter v. Municipal City of La Porte,167 an action was
brought to enjoin fluoridation of the municipal water supply,
based on allegations that the local ordinance abridged the
Privileges and Immunities Clause 168 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 169 The appellants argued that fluoridation of
the public water system was "an enforced method of taking
162. See id. at 794-95.
163. See id. at 795.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 795-96.
166. See 116 N.E.2d at 794-95.
167. 139 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1956).
168. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend X1V, § 1.
169. See 139 N.E.2d at 160.
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drugs and giving [the] same to their children... [and that]
each individual should have the right to determine what to
drink and eat without dictation from others . ...- 17o The
court determined, however, that it was "not necessary to de-
cide the constitutional issues at this stage of the proceeding"
and merely indicated that it was not "in a position to hold
conclusively as a matter of law [that] fluoridation will not
have cumulative toxic effects."171 Thus, the Teeter decision
did not advance the legal analysis of constitutional issues
raised by forced fluoridation.
Almost ten years after Teeter, plaintiffs in Paduano v.
City of New York1 72 sought to enjoin the proposed fluoridation
of the public water system arguing that, among other things,
it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article
I, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution. 173 The
Paduano court held that fluoridation of the water supply
"may be the only practical method of insuring the administra-
tion of this drug to the very young," and is probably the most
efficient and cheapest method of doing so.' 74 The court also
held that lilt is not shocking to realize that the State, acting
in the interest of children, too young to be sui juris, 175 may
intervene in the parental area." 76 The plaintiffs' motion for
an injunction was denied because the Paduano court felt
bound by the principles of stare decisis 77 to follow other
cases, where the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to all
fluoridation challenges. 78
170. Id. at n.2.
171. Id. at 161.
172. 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
173. See id. at 538.
174. Id. at 539.
175. "Sui juris" means "possessing full social and civil rights; not under any
legal disability, or the power of another, or guardianship." BLAci's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1000 (6th ed. 1991).
176. 257 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
177. Stare decisis is a policy of courts to abide by decided cases and not dis-
turb a settled principle of law. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 978 (6th ed. 1991).
178. See 257 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/7
1997]FLUORIDATION OF PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 673
(c) Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws
It is undisputed even by the proponents of fluoridation
that any benefit provided by fluoridation affects only tooth
enamel that is still developing in children. Therefore, chal-
lenges have been made alleging that fluoridation of public
water systems violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 79 because it affects only a limited
class, namely, children.' 80 These challenges have been dis-
missed because the United States Supreme Court has held
that police power may be applied to a reasonable classifica-
tion, and that just because the class is not all-embracing does
not mean the legislation violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 181 Several courts have held that fluoridation does not
affect only a limited class because "[c]hildren of today are
adult citizens of tomorrow" 8 2 and "it is apparent that chil-
dren become adults." 83 Thus, the characterization of fluori-
dation laws as "class legislation" has passed the rational
basis test applied by the courts.
2. First Amendment Right to Freedom of Religion
Another constitutional challenge asserted against fluori-
dation is based upon religious beliefs held by many citizens
which forbid them to take medication for the prevention or
treatment of any disease. The First Amendment to the
179. The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[nlo State shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
180. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 74 So. 2d 142, 146 (La. 1954),
appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 892 (1954). See also Hall v. Bates, 148 S.E.2d 345
(S.C. 1966); Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Com. P1. 1953),
affd, 127 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956). For a
classification involving age, see City Comm'n of Fort Pierce v. State ex rel. Al-
tenhoff, 143 So. 2d 879 (D.C. Fla. 1962). In this case, plaintiffs alleged that
fluoridation of the water system "is violative of the constitutional guarantee
against Class Legislation in that its proponents only claim it is beneficial to
children of the age group of one to fourteen years." Id. at 881.
181. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922). See also West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v.
Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 326 (1913).
182. Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 74 So. 2d 142, 145 (La. 1954).
183. Readey v. St. Louis County Water Co., 352 S.W.2d 622, 632 (Mo. 1961).
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United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."18 4 Thus,
many cases have been brought, based on the theory that fluo-
ridation violates the First Amendment right to freedom of
religion. 185
A First Amendment challenge was raised in Kraus v.
City of Cleveland, 86 where the plaintiff contended that fluori-
dation of the public water system "compels people to take a
form of medication contrary to their religious beliefs" in viola-
tion of the First Amendment.8 7 The Kraus court noted that
the United States Supreme Court has held that "freedom of
religion has a dual aspect, freedom to believe, and freedom to
act exercising such beliefs. The first is an absolute right,
[but] the second is not," and therefore may be regulated in
order to protect society.' 88 Accordingly, the Kraus court held
that the constitutional guaranty to freedom of religion must
yield to regulations imposed "in the interests of the public
welfare."' 89
3. Ninth Amendment Implied Right of Personal
Privacy
In addition to the explicit constitutional rights protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Ninth Amend-
ment provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." 190 This amendment was en-
acted so as to ensure that the government cannot violate fun-
damental rights of the public merely because those rights
were not explicitly protected by the Constitution. Under the
184. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
185. See, e.g., Teeter v. Municipal City of La Porte, 139 N.E.2d 158 (Ind.
1956) (challenging a municipal ordinance on the grounds that it violated the
rights of those whose religious beliefs were opposed to medication).
186. 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio Com. P1. 1953).
187. Id. at 805.
188. Id. at 805, 806, (citing Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940)).
189. Id. at 808.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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auspices of the Ninth Amendment, the City of Brainerd, Min-
nesota alleged that people have a prerogative to refuse fluori-
dation which is derived from the implicit constitutional right
of privacy. 191 While there is no explicit mention of the right
of privacy in the Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court has held that "the right of privacy protects an individ-
ual's right 'to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person,"' such
as the decision whether or not to terminate pregnancy.192
The Brainerd court recognized that while the United
States Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, "the right
of personal privacy could also extend to protect an individ-
ual's decision regarding what he will or will not ingest into
his body."193 The Supreme Court, however, has held that
"the constitution does not protect an individual 'against all
intrusions' but only 'against intrusions which are not justified
in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper man-
ner'."194 The Brainerd court found that while forced fluorida-
tion does infringe upon an individual's freedom, such
infringement cannot be given substantial weight if there are
no significant adverse consequences to the individual. 195 If
any weight were given to this infringement, the court felt
that people could interfere with governmental enactment of
similar public health measures, such as chlorinating the
water.196 Accordingly, the Brainerd court held "that fluorida-
tion is a justified intrusion into an individual's bodily
integrity."197
The most recent reported challenge to fluoridation is the
1994 case Safe Water Association, Inc. v. City of Fond Du
Lac.198 In Safe Water, the appellant asserted, inter alia, that
191. See Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624,
630 (Minn. 1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803 (1976).
192. Id. at 631 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
195. See id. at 632.
196. See 241 N.W.2d at 632.
197. Id. at 633.
198. 516 N.W.2d 13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994), review dismissed, 520 N.W.2d 91
(Wis. 1994).
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the city's adoption of an fluoridation ordinance violated the
constitutional right to privacy. 99 Plaintiffs had to first over-
come the hurdle presented by Froncek v. City of Milwau-
kee, 200 a 1955 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision upholding
fluoridation. In order to dispose of its adverse impact, Safe
Water pointed out that the precedential weight of this deci-
sion was sufficiently limited by the more recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut20 1 and Roe v. Wade,20 2 which drastically enlarged the
scope of the right to privacy. 20 3 The Safe Water Court noted
that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the implicit guaran-
tee of "zones of privacy" in Carey v. Population Services,
Int'l.,204 but that this right of privacy is narrow and is subject
to some limitations.20 5 The court then granted summary
judgment against Safe Water Association, reasoning that it
failed to see any relationship between cases concerning the
freedom to make reproductive choices and the issue of the
right to be free from fluoridated water.20 6
IV. Analysis
A proper analysis of the statutes authorizing the fluori-
dation of public water systems must begin with a review of
the limitations on state police power. Laws relating to "mini-
mum wages for women and minors, maximum hours for wo-
men and minors,... control of venereal disease, blood tests
for marriage licenses, sterilization, pasteurization of milk,
chlorination of water, and vaccination have all been held
valid as based on police power exercised in regard to public
health."20 7 However, the United States Supreme Court has
never decided whether fluoridation of public water involves
constitutional issues, and thus the lower courts must make
199. See id. at 17.
200. 69 N.W.2d 242 (Wis. 1955).
201. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
202. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
203. See 516 N.W.2d at 17, 18.
204. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
205. See 516 N.W.2d at 18.
206. See id.
207. Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 127 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ohio 1955).
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their own determination if fluoridation is a valid exercise of
state police power or a constitutional violation.20 8
A. Lack of Authority Challenges
The first category of challenges to fluoridation of public
water systems involves the lack of authority for states to re-
quire fluoridation of public water systems.20 9 The first re-
ported challenge to fluoridation was De Aryan v. Butler,2 10
where the issue was whether the city council of San Diego
and the State Board of Health had the authority to require
that fluorides be added to the public water supply.211 The
District Court of Appeal held that the State Board of Health
was delegated the police power "necessary to control and reg-
ulate the purity, potability and wholesomeness of public wa-
ters in the state."212 Because there was no allegation that the
city council of San Diego abused its discretion or acted unrea-
sonably in enacting the fluoridation statute, the De Aryan
court correctly concluded that the statute was a valid exercise
of police power.213
In the case Wilson v. City of Mountlake Terrace,21 4 plain-
tiffs challenged the authority of the city to fluoridate their
water, arguing that they lived outside the city limits and,
therefore, are not citizens, residents, nor taxpayers of the
city.215 The Supreme Court of Washington correctly con-
cluded that the valid exercise of police power may not be chal-
lenged by someone experiencing an incidental effect, if such
individual does not allege that any harm resulted there-
from.21 6 The challenges to fluoridation in these two cases did
not involve constitutional issues, and, therefore, the rational
basis test was properly employed as the basis for judicial
review.
208. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
209. See supra Part III.A.
210. 260 P.2d 98 (D. Cal. 1953).
211. See id. at 101.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 102.
214. 417 P.2d 632 (Wash. 1966).
215. See id. at 633.
216. See id. at 635.
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B. Scope of Police Power Exceeded Challenges
The second category of legal challenges to fluoridation of
public water systems involves allegations that the state ex-
ceeded the scope of their police powers. 217 The appellant in
Dowell v. City of Tulsa218 contended that police power was
limited to the regulation of contagious, infectious, or danger-
ous diseases, but the court felt this distinction was immate-
rial, ridiculous, and of no consequence to the promotion of
public health. 219 In the case McGurren v. City of Fargo,220
the appellant convinced the court that he had a breach of con-
tract issue, which was then remanded to the lower court for
resolution. 22' The Dowell court properly used the rational
basis test to find that the state did not exceed the scope of its
police power, because the appellant failed to sufficiently iden-
tify a fundamental constitutional right which was infringed.
The McGurren court never reached the constitutional issues
raised, and thus did not further the constitutional analysis of
fluoridation laws.
C. Constitutional Challenges
The third category of legal challenges to fluoridation of
public water systems involves allegations that the state de-
prived an individual of their personal liberty, abridged their
privileges and immunities, or denied them equal protection of
the law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.222
1. Deprivation of Personal Liberty Challenges
The problem in making a challenge that fluoridation of
public water systems deprives a person of personal liberty is
that this constitutional right is not absolute; the Constitution
provides that no state may deprive a person of liberty without
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. 273 P.2d 859 (Okla. 1954).
219. See id. at 861, 863.
220. 66 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1954).
221. See id. at 212.
222. See supra Part III.C.1.
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due process of law.223 "Liberty" may be subdivided "into three
headings involving governmental restraints on (1) physical
freedom, (2) the exercise of fundamental constitutional
rights, and (3) other forms of freedom of choice or action."224
The liberty guaranteed and protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the freedom to marry, establish a home,
bring up children, live and work where one chooses, get a job,
acquire useful knowledge, use and enjoy one's faculties, free-
dom from unauthorized physical restraint, and those privi-
leges "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
people ,"225
A state may enact legislation and deprive citizens of that
state of any of these rights, but the citizens must first be af-
forded due process of law.226 Due process is a course of legal
proceedings according to the rules and principles which have
been established in our legal system for the protection and
enforcement of private rights.227 "Substantive" due process
provides protection from arbitrary and unreasonable actions,
while "procedural" due process requires that a party whose
rights are to be affected be given notice and an opportunity to
be heard before a court or other appropriate decision-making
body.228
223. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
224. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 13.4,
at 519 (5th ed. 1995). See also BLAci s LAW DICTIONARY 633 (6th ed. 1991)
(liberty amounts to freedom from all restraints except those justly imposed by
law which are not arbitrary and are "reasonable regulations and prohibitions
imposed in the interests of the community.")
225. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 633 (6th ed. 1991).
226. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
227. See JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
§ 13.8, at 548 (noting that "[tihe adversary process is best designed to safeguard
individual rights against arbitrary action by the government."). See also
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 346 (6th ed. 1991) (defining due process of law).
228. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) cited in JOHN E.
NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 10.6, at 358. The
Supreme Court's analysis of the substantive due process issue found that the
state interest in protecting persons from a psychotic prisoner with whom he
might come in contact with was "reasonably related to a legitimate penological
interest." JOHN E. NoWAx & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw,
§ 10.6, at 358 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 428 U.S. 78 (1987)). There was a sepa-
rate procedural due process issue in Washington, which was whether twenty-
four hour notice prior to a hearing before a medical board complied with due
35
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The appellant in Kraus v. City of Cleveland229 alleged
that he was deprived of his liberty to protect his health as he
deems best, but did not claim that he was denied due pro-
cess. 230 The Kraus trial court had applied the rational basis
test to the fluoridation statute and found it to be a valid exer-
cise of police power, which was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Ohio.231 The problem in this and every other case is
that the rational basis test does not apply if the statute being
analyzed interferes with a fundamental right.232 This is
where the ambiguity arises, because the "law" is constantly
changing, and what is unconstitutional today may be legal
tomorrow. 233 Therefore, modern courts should reanalyze the
limitations on personal liberty in light of recent Supreme
Court cases. When it is finally decided that fluoridation of
the public water systems impinges on a fundamental right,
the rational basis test will be inappropriate, and strict judi-
cial scrutiny by the courts will be required.
2. Abridgement of Privileges and Immunities
Challenges
The problem in making a challenge that fluoridation of
public water systems abridges a person's privileges and im-
munities is that the purpose of this clause is to protect "those
rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it
does not protect those rights which relate only to state citi-
zenship."23 4 The privileges and immunities challenges made
process principles. See id. at 358-59. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 836,
997 (6th ed. 1991) (defining procedural due process and substantive due pro-
cess, respectively).
229. 127 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1955).
230. See id. at 610.
231. See id. at 613-14.
232. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
234. JOHN E. NowK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10.3,
at 343 (citing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)). This
case held that "the clause only refers to uniquely federal rights such as the right
to petition Congress, the right to vote in federal elections, the right to interstate
travel or commerce, the right to enter federal lands, or the rights of a citizen
while in custody of federal officers." Id. (citing Slaughter-House Cases at 79-
81).
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in Teeter v. Municipal City of La Porte23 5 and Paduano v. City
of New York236 have nothing to do with citizenship privileges
in different states and thus are unfounded in the Constitu-
tion.237 Accordingly, these cases were properly decided using
the rational basis test of judicial review.
3. Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Challenges
The last Fourteenth Amendment challenge to statutes
authorizing the fluoridation of public water systems is that
they violate equal protection of the laws. 238 In Chapman v.
City of Shreveport,239 the appellees argued that it was unrea-
sonable to fluoridate the water when it affected only a limited
class.240 This argument, however, goes towards proving that
fluoridation statutes are not narrowly tailored, not that they
have been denied equal protection of the laws. Equal protec-
tion of the laws requires that individuals be treated in a simi-
lar manner.241 No claim was made in Chapman that the
appellee was not receiving the same protection being pro-
vided to other persons in similar circumstances; instead, he
was trying to remove himself from the prophylactic medica-
tion being provided to children through fluoridated water.242
The Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that the exercise
of police power is not objectionable solely because it does not
apply to all classes, and held that the legislature is allowed to
subject adults to fluoridation because the statute was not ar-
bitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. 243 This holding unduly
235. 139 N.E.2d 158 (Ind. 1956).
236. 257 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
237. See supra Part III.C.1.(b).
238. See supra Part III.C.l.(c).
239. 74 So. 2d 142 (La. 1954).
240. See id. at 146.
241. Fluoridation opponents raise the equal protection issue because fluori-
dation is purported to benefit only children under the age of nine, thus creating
a special class. However, "[tihe Supreme Court has not found that any form of
heightened judicial scrutiny should be used when reviewing classifications that
are based on age." JOHN E. NowA & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 14.3, at 609 n.38. The Supreme Court uses the rational basis test when
the classification does not relate to a fundamental right. See id.
242. See 74 So. 2d at 146.
243. See id. at 146, 147.
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expands the purpose of police power, which is supposed to
promote the general welfare of the majority of the public.
American households are composed mainly of adults, not chil-
dren, and thus, fluoridating public water systems is an over-
broad use of police power which can cause adverse health ef-
fects for the majority of the public.244
There are many reasonable alternatives available to par-
ents who want their children to receive fluoride treatment,
such as topical gels, mouth rinses, children's toothpaste, fluo-
ride tablets, and drops.245 A study found that "fluoride ad-
ministered in tablet form or in vitamin preparations was
more than twice as effective as fluoridated water in prevent-
ing cavities."246 Children ages 7 to 12 had no tooth decay in
54% of those who took fluoride tablets or drops since infancy,
while only 23.9% of adults with lifetime exposure to fluori-
dated water were cavity-free. 247 An additional argument
supporting fluoride supplementation from sources other than
public water systems is that fluoride tablets or drops can be
administered in exact doses, but the amount of fluoride in-
gested from drinking tap water cannot be controlled.248
These tablets or drops can then be discontinued after the per-
manent teeth have finished developing around age 10-12, or
even sooner if deleterious side effects occur.249
244. See supra Part I.
245. See generally 21 C.F.R. Part 355, Anticaries Drug Products for Over-
the-Counter Human Use. There are also many fluoridated products available
by prescription.
246. GEORGE L. WALDBOTT, M.D., FLUORIDATION: THE GREAT DILEMMA 307
(1978).
247. See id.
248. See id. A further argument against fluoridated water can be made in
that many children do not drink tap water at all. We are a society of processed
food and beverages. Infants drink canned formula, and children drink bottled
milk, juice, and soft drinks. Rare is the child who will reach for a glass of tap
water when thirsty. However, some childrens' drinks, such as Kool-Aid@, do
require tap water to make. But even these "mix it yourself" drinks will not
contain artificial fluoridation if the water is drawn from a private well. Thus,
the entire purpose of fluoridation is being unintentionally circumvented by the
advent of ready-to-drink beverages, unless of course, the beverage manufac-
turer uses fluoridated water.
249. See id.
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4. Freedom of Religion Challenges
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment challenges,
many plaintiffs alleged that the state had violated their First
Amendment right to freedom of religion.250 The appellant in
Kraus v. City of Cleveland2sl claimed that fluoridation of the
water supply compels people to take a form of medication con-
trary to their religious beliefs in contravention of the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the State Constitu-
tion.252 The United States Supreme Court has ruled on simi-
lar challenges, and has held that the freedom to believe is
absolute and is a fundamental right, but the freedom to act
according to such beliefs is not fundamental and may be regu-
lated under police powers.253
The Kraus court then tried to distinguish fluoridation
from other infringements on freedom of religion.254 The court
recognized that although the City of Cleveland is the sole
supplier of public drinking water within that city, there is no
absolute duty on the part of the city to supply water.255 Fur-
thermore, courts have held that citizens opposed to drinking
fluoridated water are free to buy non-fluoridated water be-
cause there is no direct compulsion to drink tap water.256
The Kraus court recognized that obtaining non-fluoridated
water may pose a problem of inconvenience for some and pos-
sibly of economics for others, but felt it was not a wholly im-
possible situation.257
The argument that there is no compulsion to drink fluori-
dated water is without merit. Public water systems were es-
tablished to serve the public.258 Since the majority of the
250. See supra Part Ifl.C.2.
251. 116 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1953), affd, 127 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1955), appeal
dismissed, 351 U.S. 935 (1956).
252. See id. at 805.
253. See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
254. See 116 N.E.2d at 806-08.
255. See id. at 807.
256. See Chapman v. City of Shreveport, 74 So. 2d 142, 146 (La. 1954).
257. See 116 N.E.2d at 807.
258. The public does not have a choice of providers from whom it may receive
tap water, however. One of the leading experts in water law has correctly cate-
gorized those receiving water from a public water system as "captive consum-
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public are adults, then fluoridating tap water to provide a
drug to a minority of the public (children) defeats the whole
purpose of the public water system. Besides the inconven-
ience and expense of having to buy bottled water, it is virtu-
ally impossible to escape eating processed foods that have
been prepared using fluoridated water. Therefore, there is a
compulsion to ingest fluoridated water, whether it comes
from the faucet or from the foods we eat. Although the Kraus
court felt there was no compulsion to drink fluoridated tap
water, the ease at which it reached that conclusion suggests
the worthlessness of the achievement. Despite the erroneous
conclusion by the Kraus court, it correctly applied the ra-
tional basis test to the infringement of religion challenge, be-
cause the Supreme Court has not recognized the exercise of
religion as an absolute constitutional right.259
5. Right of Privacy Challenges
The very last category of legal challenges to fluoridation
of public water systems involves allegations that the state de-
prived someone of their implied Ninth Amendment constitu-
tional right of personal privacy to be free from unwanted
ers." See A. Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21
WM. & MARY L. REV. 233, 239 (1997). The argument has been made that since
water is an article of commerce under Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458
U.S. 941 (1982), then consumers have a "freedom of choice" to seek an alternate
source for this "product," such as bottled spring water. The problem with this
argument is that it fails to recognize that the municipality has a monopoly over
the public water system; consumers cannot switch to a different provider, as is
possible with telephone service.
The United States Supreme Court has held that police power measures
which impose an undue cost and inconvenience on commerce are an unconstitu-
tional burden. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Purchasing bottled water to avoid drinking fluoridated tap water is both expen-
sive and inconvenient, and thus is an impermissible burden to be placed on the
public. Further, the highly touted charcoal filters, such as the Brita® water
pitcher, are not able to filter out fluoride. Expensive reverse osmosis systems or
distillation is required to extract fluoride out of the water. Besides this undue
burden, it would be virtually impossible to exercise your "freedom of choice" if
you are at a restaurant, school, library, shopping mall, the movies, or anywhere
away from your supply of bottled water. Therefore, the "freedom of choice" ar-
gument is untenable and merely an exercise in obfuscation.
259. See id. at 808.
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government intrusions. 260 The Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized this implicit constitutional right in Minnesota
State Board of Health v. City of Brainerd,261 but felt that it
only protected against intrusions that were unjustified or
made improperly.262 The Brainerd court felt that if much
weight was given to the right of privacy argument, then peo-
ple could start refusing to let the government make similar
intrusions. 263 Other courts have acknowledged the "zone of
privacy" espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Carey v.
Population Services, Int'l. ,264 but have held that this zone is
narrow and subject to limitations. 265
Some states, however, have determined that fluoridation
of public water systems falls within this zone of privacy. The
trial court in Chapman v. City of Shreveport266 concluded
that fluoridation of the city water supply was not reasonably
related to the public health, and that tooth decay is not a
matter of public health.267 Furthermore, it held that the
choice to ingest fluoride is strictly "within the realm of pri-
vate dental health and hygiene," and that every person
should be free to choose his medical treatment for himself
and his family.268
Along these same lines, the dissent in Minnesota State
Board of Health v. City of Brainerd269 realized that although
the majority had used a balancing test to weigh the state's
intrusion into the citizen's right of privacy, they failed to look
at other alternative means that minimized intrusion.270
Given that Minnesota's purpose was to make publicly-funded
fluoride treatment readily available, the dissent felt that the
260. See supra Part III.C.3.
261. 241 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976).
262. See id. at 631.
263. See id. at 632.
264. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
265. See Safe Water Association, Inc. v. City of Fond Du Lac, 516 N.W.2d 13,
18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
266. 74 So. 2d 142.
267. See id. at 143.
268. Id.
269. 241 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976).
270. See id. at 634 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
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city could have been compelled to provide fluorine tablets or
dental applications to whomever wanted treatment, without
infringing on the right of privacy of the majority.271 Justice
Yetka concluded by noting that there was not a compelling
state interest to fluoridate the water, especially since it could
possibly be carcinogenic, and that reasonable alternatives ex-
isted, which tipped the balance in favor of an individual's
rights.272
The dissent in Kaul v. City of Chehalis273 recognized that
measures directly affecting the bodily integrity of a person
represent the most penetrating exercise of police power.274
Only the emergency of a present danger justifies quarantine,
isolation, or compulsory treatment, and it is doubtful whether
compulsory vaccination can be made without such danger.275
Justice Hill, in his dissent, pointed out that any proposed
health regulation must not impair essential rights and princi-
ples, and anyone who wants or needs fluorine can get a pre-
scription for topical application, or ingest it by other ways.276
Additionally, he noted that the United States Supreme Court
has held that health regulations must not restrain personal
liberty "under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of
the same right by others" or unless there is "pressure of great
dangers" to the public's safety.277
Justice Hill reiterated the well known fact that "[w]hile
dental caries may be termed a 'disease' which is prevalent in
the teeth of almost everyone, it is not contagious or communi-
cable in any way."278 In addition, "[d]ental caries in no way
endangers the public health in the sense that its existence in
the teeth of one individual might adversely affect the per-
sonal health of any other individual."279 Furthermore, Jus-
271. See id.
272. See id. at 634-35.
273. 277 P.2d 352 (Wash. 1954)(en banc).
274. See id. at 359 (Hill, J., dissenting, citing Freund on Police Power 116,
§ 123).
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
278. 277 P.2d at 359.
279. Id. at 359-60.
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tice Hill felt that allowing the state to fluoridate public water
systems would open the door to compulsory mass medication
or preventative treatment for any disease without regard to a
person's right to decide such matters for himself.2 0 Justice
Hill concluded that the "prevention of dental caries by com-
pulsory treatment of the teeth does not fall within the scope
of protection of the public dental health for which the police
power may be invoked."281 He believed that education and
persuasion, not compulsion, should be the government's goal
if fluorine is actually the key to dental health.28 2
D. Supreme Court Stance on Unwanted Medical
Treatment
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,28 3
the United States Supreme Court stated that although many
state courts have analyzed the right to refuse medical treat-
ment under the implied constitutional right of privacy, it "is
more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest."28 4 In Cruzan, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior deci-
sions."288 Additionally, the Supreme Court assumed that the
Constitution would grant a person "a constitutionally pro-
tected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition."28 6
In a prior case, the Supreme Court held that "[tihe forcible
injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body
represents a substantial interference with that person's lib-
erty."287 However, the court also recognized that while a per-
son has a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause, whether the person's "constitutional
280. See id. at 360.
281. Id. at 361.
282. See id. (emphasis added).
283. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
284. Id. at 279 n.7.
285. Id. at 278.
286. Id. at 279.
287. Id. at 278 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).
43
688 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
rights have been violated must be determined by balancing
his liberty interests against the relevant state interests."288
This "relevant" state interest, also referred to as a "compel-
ling" state interest,289 is one which the state is forced or
obliged to protect.290 While all states have a compelling in-
terest to prevent contagious diseases, such as the spread of
smallpox in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,291 tooth decay is not
contagious, poses no risk of an outbreak, and thus is not a
compelling interest such as would require state intervention.
Accordingly, courts should apply a strict scrutiny standard of
review when balancing a substantial liberty interest against
fluoridation, which is, in effect, merely a state-mandated pro-
phylactic measure for a noncontagious disease. A strict scru-
tiny standard requires that a state have a compelling interest
to enact legislation, and that such legislation be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its purpose so as not to infringe on personal
liberty interests protected by the Constitution.292
There is clearly no right or compelling interest for the
federal government to mandate fluoridation of drinking
water because it is known that fluoride is a contaminant
which may have an adverse affect on the health of persons. 293
If states were bound by the Safe Water Drinking Act, then
they would be prohibited from requiring fluoridation of the
public water systems, despite their police power. This state
police power is supposed to be used to promote the general
health and welfare of the public, and should not be used as
authority to purposely add contaminants into public drinking
water. While reasonable minds may differ about whether the
state's interest in health encompasses non-contagious dis-
eases and whether this interest is compelling, fluoridation of
public water systems does not pass constitutional muster be-
288. 497 U.S. at 279, (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
289. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155.
290. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 690
(1977) (holding that a statute restricting access to nonhazardous contraceptives
had no relation to any compelling state interest in protecting public health).
291. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
292. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
293. See generally National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Fluoride,
50 Fed. Reg. 47,142 - 47,155 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 141.51).
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cause it fails the second prong of the strict scrutiny test: it is
not narrowly tailored to achieve the legislature's purpose,
and reasonable alternatives exist.
V. Conclusion
It is incumbent upon the United States Supreme Court
to grant certiorari to the next fluoridation challenge brought
based upon a due process violation of an individual's liberty
interest. Whereas the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the
issue of whether fluoridation invades a constitutionally pro-
tected interest when the state mandates the ingestion of a
prophylactic drug to prevent a noncontagious disease, the
Court has held, however, that a state may exercise its police
power to protect the public from the spread of contagious dis-
ease. This distinction between contagious and noncontagious
disease is critical because it determines the extent of the
state interest when balancing the right of an individual to be
free from compulsory medication against the state interest in
attempting to prevent tooth decay by fluoridating public
water systems.
The holding in Washington v. Harper294 reflects the mod-
ern Supreme Court position, whereby "[tihe forcible injection
of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents
a substantial interference with that person's liberty."295
However, this holding is qualified by the caveat that whether
this constitutionally protected liberty interest has been vio-
lated "must be determined by balancing that liberty interest
against the relevant state interests."296 The balancing is ac-
complished by subjecting fluoridation statutes to a strict
scrutiny review in order to determine if they pass constitu-
tional muster.
Because there is no compelling state interest to mandate
prophylactic drugs for a noncontagious disease, the means of
accomplishing the legislature's goals is not narrowly tailored,
and reasonable alternatives exist, fluoridation statutes will
294. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
295. Id. at 229.
296. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 279.
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fail the strict scrutiny test. Pursuant to the holdings in
Harper and Cruzan, it is reasonably certain that fluoridation
of public water systems will eventually be deemed a substan-
tial invasion of personal liberty in violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America.
Fluoridating public water in an attempt to target chil-
dren whose permanent teeth are still developing is like using
a shotgun to shoot an apple off someone's head; sure, you hit
the apple, but the side effects are undesirable.
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